ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY

IN TACKLING DISINFORMATION AND SPECULATION IN NORTH MACEDONIA

Introduction

The rapid development and spread of information and communication technologies has created a series of socio-political challenges for democratic societies globally. These processes have become particularly evident in the second decade of the 21st century with the emergence and mass use of new media, and have particularly intensified in the recent years with the global COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. In parallel with these developments, terms such as 'disinformation' and 'fake news' have found their place in both dictionaries and the societal reality, while bringing far-reaching political consequences (Martens et al, 2018).

In this regard, research that aims to study the correlation between disinformation and democratic processes is a necessary first step towards a better understanding of these complex social phenomena, their influence and consequences. This research aims to make exactly such a contribution, through a qualitative analysis of the relationship between disinformation and institutional transparency in the Macedonian context. In an attempt to research and dive deep into the issue, it directs the attention on the transparency of institutions at the national level (primarily the executive power: central Government and ministries, as well as the Assembly and the President), as one of the prerequisites for preventing the spread of disinformation, and also for the media as an important factor in these complex processes.

The research focuses primarily, on two key social entities – state institutions on national level and mass media (both traditional and online media). The overall goal is to identify if and to what extent the (non) transparency of state institutions can contribute to the (combat) spread of disinformation. In addition, the research aims to determine the role of the media in that 'labyrinth.' The analysis is an attempt to answer the following key questions:

- *What is the current awareness/perception about disinformation, as well as the correlation between transparency and disinformation among institutions and the media?*

- *Whether and how the policy of transparency, accountability and openness of state institutions at the national level contributes to tackling the inflow of disinformation in the public sphere?*

- *Which forms and methods do communication specialists in state institutions use to apply transparency and combat disinformation?*

- *Whether and how European standards are transposed in the Macedonian legislation with regard to transparency, accountability and openness of state institutions?*

- *Whether and how does the inflow of disinformation and manipulation, as well as the current level of transparency of the institutions, affect the media and journalists and vice versa?*

- *Whether and how can disinformation be prevented? What role could the production of documents and mechanisms/bodies for the prevention of disinformation play and with which possible consequences?*

Methodological Approach

The empirical part of the research examines the relationship between institutional transparency and disinformation in the Macedonian context. Methodologically, the research is based on four methods/techniques: desk research, content analysis of relevant documents, focus groups with media representatives and interviews with representatives of state institutions on national level:

1) Desk-research - analysis of documents such as laws, strategies, recommendations, plans, codes of European and Macedonian regulations on institutional transparency and disinformation.

2) Focus groups with journalists from print media (daily, weekly, news agencies), TV stations (public and private, national, regional), radios (public, national, regional) and online media. There were four focus groups with 6-8 journalists, including a total of 35 journalists.

3) Semi-structured interviews - with representatives of the Government, Parliament, Office of the President and state institutions - ministries, primarily aimed at persons responsible for communications, managers or coordinators for communications, spokespersons and persons responsible for free access to public information. A total of 26 questionnaires were disseminated, and answers were submitted to 20 questionnaires. Answers were received from representatives of the Assembly, the Intelligence Agency, 9 ministries and 8 representatives from the Government responsible for transparency and the Office of the President. The data was gathered between November 2022 and January 2023.

The Correlation between Disinformation and Transparency

Disinformation and transparency are considered inversely related i.e., opposing terms and social phenomena. Disinformation stands for deliberate creation and dissemination of false information or misinformation, while transparency is a state of openness and honesty. Transparency helps to build trust and prevent the spread of disinformation. On the other hand, disinformation can undermine the trust by spreading false, partially false information or misinformation. Therefore, transparency can be seen as their counterbalance as it can help prevent false information and promote sharing of accurate information (Lazer et al, 2018). This is especially important in the digital age, when disinformation spreads quickly and causes significant damage, undermines trust in institutions with potentially serious consequences. In some cases, disinformation can be spread by the institutions themselves in an attempt to manipulate public opinion or conceal the truth. The lack of transparency of Government institutions means the absence or curtailment of citizens' right of access to information. This implies

elimination or marginalisation of citizens from decision-making and policy-making processes. Hence, the absence of transparency means limitation or deficit of democratic processes, and at the same time it opens up space for the spread of disinformation and speculation, thus undermining the functioning of the media.

The lack of transparency of institutions increases the risk of disinformation, which can trigger violations of human rights from various aspects because it disables citizens to follow decision-making by the Government, in an informed manner. Lack of institutional transparency can lead to the spread of disinformation in numerous ways. First, when institutions are not transparent about their actions and decisions, an environment is created where disinformation can thrive, because people become susceptible to believing false or misleading information when they do not have access to the facts. Second, the lack of transparency can also make it easier for those who intentionally spread disinformation. Without transparency, it is hard to hold institutions and individuals accountable for the information they share. Finally, a lack of transparency can make it difficult for people to distinguish between credible and non-credible sources of information. When institutions are not transparent, people could find it hard to believe who to trust, which increases the probability for people to believe disinformation that is in line with their own beliefs of prejudice.

Therefore, increasing institutional transparency is the logical step that can be taken to prevent or reduce the impact of disinformation. On the other hand, taking strict measures by the authorities to prevent disinformation creates a risk for violation of the right to freedom of speech, freedom of media and editorial freedom. Institutional transparency is an important component of good governance and can help in the promotion of trust and responsibility, in balancing the efforts to oppose disinformation, while offering an approach that ensures access to accurate and credible information, and media and the public retain their freedom of speech.

Methods and Risks in Tackling Disinformation

Methods and approaches for tackling disinformation must start with an awareness about the risks associated with regulating this field. There are several major risks associated with trying to regulate disinformation. One of the main risks is the potential for censorship and restriction of freedom of speech. Governments and private companies can use regulation as a mechanism to silence those they disagree with or to suppress certain type of information. In addition, disinformation is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult to define and identify. This aggravates the process of designing regulations that effectively target disinformation without restricting free speech. Even if they are designed, they may be difficult to apply, particularly in the context of the vast and growing digital landscape. On the other hand, the excessive regulation of disinformation can lead to undesirable consequences and squash freedom

of speech and freedom of expression. Additional difficulties arise from the fact that some forms of disinformation can be difficult to distinguish from satire or parody, which can lead to censorship of legitimate forms of expression.

European Regulation on Disinformation and Transparency

The European Union's approach for tackling disinformation is particularly relevant for the Republic of North Macedonia as a candidate-country for EU membership. Disinformation is a global challenge, and the EU faces similar issues and challenges, but it has far more advanced institutional mechanisms to tackle these processes. The comprehensive strategy for tackling disinformation has an important role, which includes adoption and application of new regulation that primarily aims at improved transparency of very large platforms and the modes of how content and algorithms are moderated, investment in fact-checking, media literacy and support of independent media. Access to these resources, as well as the expertise of EU institutions and Member States in combating disinformation, can offer solutions that are also relevant to the Macedonian context, particularly since the EU approach to tackling disinformation is based on common democratic values, such as freedom of expression, media pluralism and the protection of fundamental rights. In addition, respecting these values is important for EU candidate countries, since they are part of the democratic criteria for membership that must be met.

Comprehensive European Approach of the EU to Combat Disinformation

In recent years, the spread of disinformation online has become a reason for concern in numerous countries across the world, particularly due to the impact of such practices on informed citizenship and democratic systems as a whole. As far as 2018, the European Commission (EC) recognised the significant exposure of its citizens to online disinformation as a major challenge for European democracies (EC, 2018a & EC, 2018b). In response to these challenges, to ensure citizens' access to credible information and sources, the EC introduced several measures aimed at creating a so-called comprehensive European Approach (Ibid). The European Approach to tackle the challenges of disinformation generally refers to the actions and strategies taken by the European Union (EU) and its Member States to address the issue of

disinformation. The Approach stems from regulation, self-regulation of digital platforms initiated by the EC (EU Code of Practice on Disinformation), as well as non-binding communications and recommendations from the Commission to member states.

EU documents and policies define disinformation as the dissemination of false or misleading content for economic or political gain, while at the same time it can cause public harm, a threat to democracy, security and health of citizens. Disinformation is treated as a major challenge, which requires a coordinated response from institutions, online platforms, media and citizens.

Few documents are emphasised as key in the EU for the prevention of disinformation:
Communiqué of the European Commission on Tackling Disinformation - 2018, Action Plan against Disinformation - 2018, European Democracy Action Plan – 2020, Code of Practice on Disinformation 2018 and 2022, Digital Services Act 2020, European Media Freedom Act 2022, The European Media and Audio-visual Action Plan 2021 and European Digital Media Observatory 2021.

The EU approach to preventing the spread of disinformation makes a clear distinction between the media, especially the public service, and social media as a potential source or transmitter of disinformation. One of the most important specifics of EU policies is the fact that media is treated as a subject-partner for preventing the spread of disinformation. Thereto, the European approach to preventing disinformation is accompanied by measures and policies to strengthen democracy, which include protection of the journalistic profession. These measures are of particular importance and offer guidance for national strategies and policies to prevent disinformation in the Republic of North Macedonia. Within these frameworks, attention should be paid to European measures for protecting journalists, and especially female journalists, from threats online. It is necessary to align national legislation related to media with the European regulation (the Audio-visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), the Digital Services Act, the proposed European Media Freedom Act, etc.) with other European standards, self-regulatory and co-regulatory documents, as well as with the recommendations by the Council of Europe. Also, the EU Directive on strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) should be fully integrated into national strategies and policies. This abuse is called strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). The Directive treats strategic lawsuits as a special form of harassment, which relies on unfounded or excessive legal proceedings, usually petitioned by state authorities, powerful companies or powerful individuals.

Transparency plays a key role in the European approach to tackling disinformation and is seen as a key tool to address the problem of disinformation, since it enables users to identify the sources of information and make informed decisions about the reliability of the information they come across online. Overall, transparency is considered a key element of the European approach to tackling disinformation, because it helps to create a more open, accountable and trustworthy information environment and supports the efforts of policy-makers, businesses and civil society organisations to tackle challenges posed by disinformation.

EU documents and policies define disinformation as the dissemination of false or inaccurate content for economic or political gain, while at the same time it can cause public harm, cause a threat to democracy, security and health of citizens. Disinformation is treated as a major challenge, which requires a coordinated response from institutions, online platforms, media and citizens. The main goals of the so-called European Approach to tackling disinformation are:

• To strengthen the resilience of democratic societies against disinformation

• To support free and independent media and quality journalism

• To promote transparency and accountability in online platforms and advertising

• To strengthen co-operation and coordination between EU member states and international partners

• To empower citizens by improving media literacy and critical thinking skills.

Generally, the current approach can be seen as primarily designed to (1) prevent illegal micro-targeting of voters by protecting personal data; and (2) combating disinformation by increasing the transparency of online platforms. Another important aspect of the European approach is the emphasis on co-operation between different stakeholders, including governments, technology companies, media and civil society organisations.

Institutional Transparency and Disinformation in the Macedonian Context

Relevant national documents relating to transparency are Open Government Partnership (Partnership for Open Government), Open Data Strategy and Transparency Strategy. Relevant national acts that relate to disinformation are the Proposal Plan for Resolute Action against Spreading Disinformation and Attacks on Democracy, as well as two other documents that implicitly or explicitly touch upon the issue of disinformation. One is the National Strategy for Cyber Security of the Republic of Macedonia (2018-2022) which does not directly address disinformation, but contains elements and activities that touch upon this issue, particularly in relation to the issue of cyber-culture and the culture of cyber-security which can be considered related. The second document is the National Strategy for Building Resilience and tackling Hybrid Threats of the Republic of North Macedonia (2021). The strategy defines six areas of operational activities addressing hybrid threats, and disinformation is mentioned in several of them. In doing so, disinformation is addressed in a broader framework, as part of hybrid threats.

In comparison to the European Union which has developed a comprehensive strategy to combat disinformation, the Macedonian approach to tackling disinformation is still in its early beginnings, and the country is in the process of developing effective measures to tackle the issue. The European Commission country report on North Macedonia for 2022, highlights several areas in which it is necessary to improve institutional transparency. The report indicates that civil society organisations need to be involved in order to improve transparency in policy-making and inclusiveness in consultative processes.

The need for transparency in the financing of political parties is also emphasised, and need for transparency in access to the judicial position. The report points to the issue of lack of transparency and efficiency of state aid, as well as the need to improve transparency in public procurement and transparency of the budget and the effectiveness of public expenditures. According to the report,

the Ministry of Finance 'must put additional efforts to increase public participation at every stage of budget preparation, execution and reporting.'

Regarding the improving the freedom and transparency of media, the report states that there should be greater transparency in advertising by state institutions and political parties in media. The report points to the problem of absence of legal obligations for online portals, regarding the transparency of their ownership. It also points to the need to align national legislation with EU standards, to ensure independence, professional standards and financial sustainability of the public broadcasting service, to continue activities for self-regulation of media, as well as to solve the problem with the labour rights of journalists, particularly the cases with threats and violence, and sanction perpetrators. The report states a lack of transparency in access to information. In this context, it indicates that the administrative capacity at all levels remains insubstantial, with insufficient human and financial resources for the implementation and application of the existing legislation. Portion of the problems and issues noted by the EU report have been addressed continuously within the international Open Government Partnership program, initiated by the United States.

Practicing Transparency by State Institutions in Combating Disinformation

Numerous political leaders around the world respect the idea of Open Government. The example is followed by the European Union, although it is not a Government in the literal sense of the word, thus strengthening its legitimacy. Since 2011, North Macedonia has been normatively paving the way for Open Government, and that process continues today.

Thereto, empirically, the research examines the relationship between institutional transparency (openness) and disinformation in the Macedonian context. Thematically, the analysis provides insight into the ways in which institutional transparency is perceived and practiced by the representatives of the institutions, as well as the way they think about and tackle disinformation. Thus, the basis is the national strategic documents and action plans, which outline the key areas, priorities, measures, methods, instruments and implementers of planned activities for Open Government and tackling disinformation.

In Focus: Transparent Functioning of State Institutions

Strategically, with a separate document (from 2019), North Macedonia has outlined active, i.e. proactive/voluntary transparency, which implies the publication of data by the Government and the bodies of the state administration, without the citizens, legal entities, media, etc. to use the mechanisms for access to public information as laid down in the legislation. In particular, with an action plan, the planned activities are defined, but the monitoring of the Action Plan of the Transparency Strategy (which refers to the period 2019-2020) determines low level of realisation of the planned activities.

What is the situation currently?

Transparency, i.e. active transparency placed high on the agenda of the institutions of the central Government, is slowly and unevenly implemented, both legally and in terms of action-planning, as well as in the absence of interdepartmental co-ordination of measures related to enhancing transparency. Hence the need for a systemic approach that will cover all levels of Government, as well as other segments of society. At the same time, the battle with disinformation, in the absence of a harmonised definition in state institutions, leaves room for each department to approach their interpretation separately. This potentially affects the effectiveness of tackling disinformation. This is complemented by insubstantial institutional capacities, staffing and (lack of) training of public relations departments for tackling disinformation that continuously spread and undermine democracy.

Despite the multitude of strategic documents to improve transparency, there is lack of evaluation of the completed measures laid down in the strategic documents and action plans.

Journalists evaluate the transparency of the institutions of the central Government, first of all, as formal-legal and technical, often for PR purposes. According to them, the institutions are not open if the officials' every step is followed and a huge amount of material is produced from that, but when a certain issue or problem is covered journalistically and thematically, but it is often evaded. For journalists, transparent Government is not the one with daily press releases, photos, video materials, that is just good PR. They consider press conferences (especially those of the Government) to be formal nad dysfunctional, with press releases that journalists have received in advance, and they rarely receive answers to other questions. Hence the dilemma about the role of spokespersons, who rarely answer orally, requiring that questions be sent to them in writing to

consult with the competent people. According to the journalists, the web pages are informative, with service information, galleries of events, technical information for citizens, and for information about the work of the institution (decisions, solutions, laws, protocols, regulations…) they often need 'user manual'. The tool for free access to information is defined as 'technically delicate' which requires a very skilful and precisely written request that makes the work especially hard for journalists who do investigative journalism.

Undoubtedly, disinformation is a serious problem that journalists face every day in their work. They define them as false, incorrect information and news, and they consider social networks and the huge number of portals (primarily unregistered) as the biggest generators. They point to numerous entities as sources, 'producers' of disinformation, such as intelligence groups, political parties, powerful structures, companies, and even officials, party bots, state institutions, above all, for political and economic gain. The media landscape is 'oversaturated', information changes daily, from minute to minute, and journalists, knowingly or unknowingly, often fall into the 'trap' of conveying disinformation or half-truths, especially for news from abroad, but also domestic news when they cannot get relevant information, when there is no transparent channel. In combatting disinformation, they appeal for respecting the professional journalistic standards, but also media literacy education.

Concluding Remarks

The development and expansion of information and communication technologies, among other things, has led to an increase in the influence of disinformation with far-reaching political consequences on democratic societies around the world. In the digital age, disinformation can spread quickly and cause significant damage, erode trust in institutions and lead to the spread of false information with potentially serious consequences. This has become especially evident in recent years, during the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

At the same time, transparency has emerged as a counterweight to disinformation, due to its role in openness, building trust, preventing false information and promoting accurate and open information. However, the absence of institutional transparency means curtailing citizens' right of access to information, their marginalisation from decision-making processes and policy-making. These tendencies not only disable citizens to follow the decision-making in the Government in an informed manner, but also increase the risk of disinformation. When institutions are not transparent about their actions and decisions, the lack of institutional transparency can lead to the spread of disinformation. When people do not have access to the facts, they become susceptible to believing disinformation.

When institutions are not transparent, it can be difficult for people to know who to trust, which increases the probability that people will believe disinformation that is in line with their beliefs or prejudices.

When trying to regulate disinformation, it is necessary to be aware of the risks, the biggest of which relates to censorship and the restriction of freedom of speech. Considering the potential risks, the best approach to tackling disinformation should be focused on narrowing the conditions for the creation and spread of disinformation, rather than censoring. The best manner to achieve this is a proactive rather than reactive approach that includes some of the following approaches: increasing media literacy and institutional transparency, open collaboration between various stakeholders, including governments, technology companies, media and civil society organisations in locating and monitoring the issue, encouraging self-regulation particularly in media and online media, investing in research and decreasing the structural economic benefits from the spread of disinformation.

In that context is also the European regulation on disinformation, which consists of several action plans against disinformation, codes and laws (for digital services and for media freedoms) whose attention is directed to the media sphere, the protection of media pluralism, journalistic independence and editorial freedom, transparent media ownership, standards for transparent operation of online platforms. Thus the approach to preventing the spread of disinformation, makes a clear distinction between the media, especially the public service, and social media as a potential source or transmitter of disinformation. One of the most important specifics of EU policies on this issue is the fact that the media is treated as an entity - a partner to prevent the spread of disinformation and hence the measures and policies to strengthen democracy which include protection of the journalistic profession.

In Macedonia, in 2019, the Proposed Plan for Resolute Action against Spreading Disinformation was transparently promoted and it has not been adopted as an official document to date, although some of the planned measures (primarily security ones) have been implemented in practice. In contrast to the European approach and protection of the journalistic profession in combatting disinformation, the Proposal Plan, among other things (in the proactive measures), provides for the Government to introduce 'clear criteria for the media that are accredited to follow events and press conferences, in accordance with the standards of the journalistic profession', which led as expected, to a fierce reaction from the media and journalists that it was an extremely undemocratic act and a blow to the freedom of the media, raising the question whether this was a way to combat disinformation, or paving the way to silence the critical public and restrict freedom of speech and editorial media freedom. Then there are several more documents - strategies (for cyber security, for hybrid threats), but in none of them there is a clear definition of disinformation. Even the government institutions do not have a consolidated definition of disinformation, with the exception of some that rely on the definitions from NATO and the EU, without specifying them. The absence of a clear and harmonised definition between government institutions questions the creation of efficient, coordinated policies and measures for their prevention.

In practice, in search for public information, the media and journalists are constantly confronted with disinformation and speculation. State institutions are no exception, but also the citizens, as 'end-users of information.' The main actors of disinformation are widespread, from intelligence groups, powerful structures, business structures, but not excluding, though mostly unintentionally, out of ignorance or in the rush to be the first on the public stage, journalists, state institutions, local self-government, political parties, officials. Hence the conclusion that combatting disinformation is a complex process that neither the media, nor the institutions, nor the civil society organisations, least of all the citizens themselves, can combat alone. And more importantly, it is a long-term process in which one of the key factors is the general, but also the media literacy. For this we need a strategic plan with good measures that will be consistently implemented. Certainly, it should be with a clear definition of disinformation, to avoid the 'trap' of their free, voluntarist interpretation

and questioning the creation of efficient and co-ordinated policies and measures to prevent the spread of disinformation. And perhaps more importantly, a consolidated, harmonised definition of disinformation as a bulwark against the risk that anti-disinformation policies will be aimed at silencing the critical public and restrict free speech and journalistic editorial freedom.

Regarding transparency, the openness of the state institutions, the theory simply notes that it is like 'making the invisible visible', but also knows how to characterize it as a metaphor with many faces, and 'if you ask ten citizens (and politicians) who think the Government should be more transparent, you can expect eleven answers' (Hillebrandt, 2021: 292). Within the EU, starting from the early 1990s, through numerous decisions, codes, it received an institutional regulatory form in 2001.

In the Macedonian context, this story started in 2011, but the 'strategic' impulse was in 2019 and is focused on active (voluntary) transparency, which means the dissemination of free and regularly updated information without anyone requesting it from the state institutions, or for the institutions themselves to offer citizens 'as much information as possible.' But first of all, the passive transparency measures should be completed, i.e. the full implementation of the Law on Free Access to Public Information (primarily Article 10), which clearly lists which and what kind of data the institutions are obliged to publish on their webpages. At the same time, chronologically speaking, measurements (for the transparency index) and monitoring (according to the principle of self-evaluation of institutions) point to the improvement of institutional transparency against the failed implementation of the Transparency Strategy, the absence of a new strategy as well as the reduction of the measures to strengthen institutional transparency within the program for Open Government Partnership. Thus, out of the several adopted documents, only the Open Data Strategy offers a more comprehensive definition of transparency. Most of the documents are now outdated (especially the Transparency Strategy).

The perception remains that there is almost no change in the culture of public administration, for Government officials to be transparent and accountable to the public. The media, journalists point to relative, formal and even transparency of institutions that primarily favours the personal image of the office holder declaring it as transparency. Spokespersons, press conferences or webpages of the institutions are of little help for obtaining information on current issues and problems. Finally, transparency cannot be limited to press conferences, non/updated web pages, available/unavailable spokespersons for questions and answers, or measuring indices. Transparency is a systemic issue and requires a systemic approach. Apart from publishing and availability of information, it also implies a binding, clear, open, understandable process of making decisions by the Government, as well as mechanisms for correction. If these three aspects are not represented in parallel then there is no transparency, it is not sustainable in a systemic way, despite the indices and the ratings.

Recommendations

- It is extremely important to ensure that the range of measures to tackle disinformation does not affect freedom of expression and create an environment for self-censorship, as well as creating or increasing the risk of violating the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the media and editorial freedom.

- Preparation of a National Strategy for combating disinformation with concrete measures and an action plan for implementation and a clear definition of disinformation, misinformation and malinformation, their meaning, emerging forms and challenges

- Upgrading existing institutional capacities for tackling disinformation and developing new ones

- Organising regular trainings with all public relations personnel in the ministries and the General Secretariat of the Government

- Media and journalistic organisations should organise separate trainings with journalists on tackling disinformation

- Consistent implementation of the Law on Access to Public Information, particularly Article 10, which clearly states which documents, decisions, decrees, reports, should be published by state institutions.

- Preparation of a long-term strategic plan for transparency, which will include all state institutions, both at the central and local level, as well as the non-Governmental and private (business) sectors.

- Establishing separate, independent body with experts and professionals, independent of the Government, to monitor the activities and transparency measures.

- Dynamising the activities of the Public Affairs Regional Centre at the Ministry of Defence with trainings on disinformation and hybrid threats.

- Personnel staffing of the ministries with a sufficient, appropriate number of persons in charge of public relations

- Staffing and training of persons in charge of access to public information

- Harmonisation of the Macedonian regulation with the European, especially the one related to disinformation

- Harmonisation of the national legislation related to media with the European regulation (the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the Digital Services Act, the draft European Media Freedom Act etc.) and with other European standards, self-regulatory and co-regulatory documents, as well as with the recommendations of Council of Europe

- Adoption of a National Strategy for Media Literacy (predicted by the Proposed Plan for Resolute Action against Spreading Disinformation) with a clear designation of the activities, subjects and measures for implementation.

- State support for conducting in-depth scientific research on transparency and disinformation

- Introduction of advanced training for cyber security for all levels of Government in the digital security sphere

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